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Abstract: Privacy of blockchains has been a matter of discussion since the inception of Bitcoin. Various techniques
with a varying degree of privacy protection and complexity have been proposed over the past decade. In this survey,
we present a systematic analysis of these proposals in four categories: (i) identity, (ii) transaction, (iii) consensus, and
(iv) smart contract privacy. Each of these categories have privacy requirements of its own, and various solutions have
been proposed to meet these requirements. Almost every technique in the literature of privacy enhancing technologies
have been applied to blockchains: mix networks, zero-knowledge proofs, blind signatures, ring signatures, secure MPC,
homomorphic encryption, to name just a few. We analyze each category separately in the paper. We first define the
related privacy issues, and then review the proposed solutions. The limitations of each solution and the attacks discovered
are also discussed along with the proposals. For each category, we first define the relevant privacy issues, and then review
the proposed solutions along with their features and limitations.
Key words: Blockchain, bitcoin, cryptocurrency, privacy, anonymity

1. Introduction
The blockchain technology entered our lives with the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [56], and has been regarded as
a novel technology that enables running a trusted system without a trusted authority. Bitcoin was the next
step in a long line of cryptocurrency experiments that started with Digicash [25]. Digicash and the following
cryptocurrency proposals were proposed as a libertarian way of doing electronic finance where the big brother
could not trace transactions to users, unlike credit cards or common electronic banking systems. Bitcoin
succeeded where the previous attempts failed and established itself as much more than an experiment.
The privacy provided by Bitcoin comes from its use of pseudonyms: A user does not use his realworld identity, hence his privacy is protected in a basic sense. However, repeated incidents [23, 39] and
analyses [3, 12, 53] have shown that this level of protection is not suﬀicient, and it can be possible to deanonymize
a transaction and to reveal the identity behind a pseudonym, hence deanonymizing its all other transactions.
As Bitcoin established itself as a real-world payment method, its privacy level came to be seen as
inadequate, and several privacy enhancements have been proposed. Various cryptographic techniques have
been utilized for this purpose, such as mixnets [24], ring signatures [60], and zero knowledge proofs [37].
After Bitcoin’s success, blockchain came to be considered as a general solution to run a decentralized
trusted system. More advanced blockchain systems like Ethereum [22] and Hyperledger Fabric [43] have been
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developed with extra capabilities such as smart contracts. With these developments, new privacy issues have
emerged, such as privacy of smart contracts and privacy of consensus protocols.
In this paper, we give a survey of the most significant privacy-enhancing solutions proposed for blockchain
privacy. A number of notable studies have been published with a similar theme in the past [1, 36, 46]. Our
survey is distinguished from these earlier studies in terms of its scope: We cover various aspects of privacy in
blockchains, whereas the earlier surveys mostly concentrated on identity privacy.
2. Blockchain architecture
Blockchain is an enabling technology that allows a network of users to maintain a distributed ledger. Each
user in the network has a copy of the ledger that consists of an ordered list of transactions. Users periodically
combine the transactions shared in the network into new blocks, and append these blocks to their copy using
a cryptographic hash function which enables users to keep an immutable history of records. With respect to
permission given to nodes for certain actions, blockchains can be classified under two groups: permissionless
and permissioned blockchains.
Permissionless blockchains allow anyone in the network to access all transactions written on the ledger,
to create transactions, and to take part in the consensus mechanisms. Also, permission is not required to
register in the system. In this setting, users are represented by pseudonymous addresses in the network, which
provide privacy to users up to a certain level. In permissioned blockchains, on the other hand, users should get
permission to register in the network by providing a valid credential to a particular authority, called registration
authority. Permissioned blockchains also restrict specific actions to certain users in the network. Since users
possess well-established identities to participate in the network, reaching consensus on the current state of the
ledger will be easier in a permissioned settings.
A blockchain system can have four key concepts associable with privacy:
• Nodes (or identities) in the blockchain terminology refer to users maintaining a copy of the distributed
ledger. They communicate with each other (send or receive transactions) over a peer-to-peer network
through a gossip protocol. Each node is associated with a public key–signing key pair of a digital signature
scheme employed to ensure the authenticity of transactions. Besides, each node in blockchains has access
to all the transactions propagated in the network.
• Transactions are just requests created by nodes to update states in a public ledger. There are some
particular nodes, called miners, that reflect these updates to the ledger by including the corresponding
transactions in the newly created blocks. The new blocks are appended to the ledger through consensus
mechanisms which allow nodes in the blockchain network to reach a common agreement on the current
state of the ledger. Note that each transaction is signed by its sender before being propagated in the
network to prove its origin to the receivers.
• Consensus is a mechanism executed among nodes in the blockchain network to achieve an agreement on
the current state of the ledger. A regular blockchain network assumes that some individual nodes may
fail while executing the consensus mechanism, or act maliciously to prevent other nodes from correctly
updating their ledger. In the presence of such failures, consensus mechanisms should guarantee that all
the nodes in the network add the same transactions to their ledger in the same order.
• Smart contracts are a piece of codes that enable trusted execution of a contract without relying on a
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trusted third party. After being deployed to the network, they are implemented independently by each
node on the inputs contained in a trigger transaction pointing to them.
In the following sections, we discuss the privacy requirements and proposed solutions for these four
concepts. We also review the attacks and privacy threats along with the proposed solutions rather than in
separate sections.
3. Identity privacy
Each user in blockchain has access to all transactions shared in the network. This aspect of blockchain enables
users to validate the integrity and authenticity of every transaction. However, it also brings about some privacy
challenges: It exposes the history of all the transactions associated with a particular ID to anyone in the network.
Bitcoin, for instance, uses pseudonymous addresses as the identifiers for users to unlink the connection between
the addresses and the real identities. Moreover, it allows users to create a fresh address for each transaction to
strengthen their privacy. By doing so, it achieves to ensure the privacy of the identities up to a certain degree.
However, it is still vulnerable to some deanonymization attacks [3, 12, 53]. In this section, we review some
cryptographic techniques applied to mitigate such attacks and enhance the identity privacy in blockchain-based
systems. Although this survey is mostly focused on cryptocurrency applications, we would like to note that
many interesting solutions exist in other application areas of blockchain as well (e.g., [11, 69]).
3.1. Mixing-based solutions
Mixing has been one of the oldest and best-known privacy enhancing technologies. It was first proposed by
Chaum [24] for email privacy. Since then it has been adopted to various systems, such as Tor [31].
Mixing has been considered to enhance the privacy of Bitcoin transactions since Bitcoin’s early years.
The idea is simple: A trusted party, the mixer, receives transactions from senders, shuffles them randomly, and
sends them to receivers. Of course, since all these transactions will be in public view, the transaction amounts
must be identical in order to be indistinguishable.
Although it is simple and functional, trusting a mixer for this task has several problems. First of all, the
mixer must be trusted not to steal the money it receives. Second, it knows the sender and receiver of every
transaction and must be trusted not to disclose or abuse this information. Despite these serious limitations,
several such Bitcoin tumbling services operated, such as bitmixer.io and Helix Light.
Providing a more secure mixing service for Bitcoin and alternative coins has been an active area of research. Several projects have been proposed to make the basic centralized tumbling service secure. Furthermore,
improved systems have been developed to provide decentralized mixing services.
Centralized mixing solutions: One of the earliest proposals that aims to make Bitcoin tumbling more
secure and the mixers accountable is Mixcoin [17]. The main feature of Mixcoin is that, when Alice trusts a
mixer with a transaction, she receives a signed warrant from the mixer, which roughly states that if the mixer
receives a x BTC from Alice by time t, it will send x′ BTC to Bob by time t′ . So, if the mixer steals Alice’s
money, she will publish this warrant and ruin the mixer’s reputation. Although Mixcoin provides some sort of
solution against theft, it provides no solution for the second major problem, namely linkability by the mixer.
An improvement over Mixcoin is the Blindcoin proposal [67]. It essentially adds blinding to Mixcoin.
Alice obtains the warrant from the mixer using blind signatures, hence the mixer does not see the receiver’s
identity. Later, Alice removes the blinding and publishes the warrant on a public log. As for the stealing
problem, Blindcoin is the same as Mixcoin: A mixer can steal, but at the expense of ruining its reputation.
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An original solution for centralized coin mixing that truly prevents coin theft is the CoinSwap protocol
proposed by Maxwell [52]. It is based on the idea of timed 2-of-2 escrow transactions: For Alice to transfer
money to Bob through a mix, she issues an initial transaction, which puts the money to be transferred in escrow
at the mixer for Bob to claim. Then Bob issues the release transaction within the validity period of the escrow.
Only Bob can take the money with Alice’s approval, hence this solves the theft problem. But the mixer is able
to link Alice and Bob, as in Mixcoin.
The idea of private coin mixing by escrow was carried further by TumbleBit [41]. TumbleBit aims to
provide utmost security through a combination of cryptographic techniques such as secure two-party computation, zero knowledge proofs, blinding, and fair exchange protocols. By these techniques, TumbleBit enables
exchanging Alice’s initial message and Bob’s release message without the mixer’s being able to link the two.
Of course, for this scheme to be secure, there must be many other pairs besides Alice and Bob participating at
the same time. Therefore, the protocol is executed at certain time intervals called epochs, and the participants’
messages are synchronized to prevent any timing analysis.
Decentralized mixing solutions: An alternative approach to mixer-based protocols is the decentralized
mixing protocols, where a group of senders are organized among themselves to combine their transactions.
CoinJoin, proposed by Maxwell [51], is the best known protocol in this category, and, unlike most other
protocols discussed in this section, it has been implemented and used in practice by several different systems.
The idea is simple yet effective: as shown in Figure 1, a group of users to send money privately come together
off-chain and create a combined transaction. Each user checks whether the transaction contains his output
address and signs it if it does. This simple protocol is remarkable in that it solves the theft problem. However,
the details of every transaction is open to the participants, hence there is no unlinkability provided against
insiders. A second limitation is that the anonymity provided is limited by the group size, which in turn is
limited by the number of signatures a Bitcoin transaction can accommodate.

Figure 1. CoinJoin protocol.

A protocol that solves the linkability problem of CoinJoin is CoinShuffle [61], which brings in the idea
of layered encryption from such constructions as mixnets [24] and Tor [31]. As shown in Figure 2, participants
share their payment information among themselves with multiple encryptions, which are shuffled at every step.
To see how CoinShuffle works, assume A1 , A2 , A3 , and A4 will send money to B1 , B2 , B3 , and B4 , respectively.
Let EX (.) denote encryption by the public key of user X . Then, A1 prepares the transaction packet as
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EA2 (EA3 (EA4 (B1 ))) and sends it to A2 . A2 decrypts it, prepares his own packet EA3 (EA4 (B2 )), shuffles it
with EA3 (EA4 (B1 )) randomly, and sends both to A3 . A3 decrypts them, prepares his own packet EA4 (B3 )
shuffles it with EA4 (B1 ) and EA4 (B2 ) , and sends them to A4 . A4 decrypts the received transactions, prepares
the combined transaction, and puts it on the blockchain. Each sender controls his part and signs the transaction
if it is right.
An improved version of CoinShuffle, named CoinShuffle++, has been proposed by Ruﬀing et al. [62].
It utilizes P2P mixing techniques to provide communication anonymity. Ruﬀing et al. developed the DiceMix
protocol for this purpose and built CoinShuffle++ on top of DiceMix. CoinShuffle++ is significantly more
eﬀicient than CoinShuffle.
Anonymity provided by CoinJoin and CoinShuffle is limited by the maximum number of signatures
that can fit into a single transaction. CoinParty [72] solves this limitation by secure multiparty computation
(MPC): Participants set up a shared address through an MPC protocol, and form a joint transaction. The
joint transaction is signed by the shared address, again by MPC. CoinParty provides unlinkability, but its theft
protection is conditional: Due to MPC, at least 2/3 of the participants must be honest for protocol correctness.
Another remarkable solution in this category is Xim [13]: It provides 2-party mixing utilizing a multiround
fair exchange protocol. Alice announces her interest in a private transaction on the blockchain. An interested
party, say Bob, responds to this announcement and contacts her anonymously off-chain. The two perform a
transaction using a fair exchange protocol. One advantage of Xim over other decentralized mixing protocols is
that the anonymity set is all the users using the service at that time, similar to that in the centralized mixing
protocols. Table 1 provides a comparison of the mixing-based methods discussed in this section.

Figure 2. CoinShuffle protocol.

3.2. Ring signatures
Ring signatures, first introduced by [60], allow a user to create a signature on a message by designating a ring
of possible signers including himself without disclosing which member of that ring actually signed the message.
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Table 1. Comparison of mixing-based methods.

Protocol
Mixcoin [17]
Blindcoin [67]
TumbleBit [41]
CoinJoin [51]
CoinShuffle++ [62]
CoinParty [72]
Xim [13]

Unlinkability
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Theft prevention
Accountable
Accountable
Yes
Yes
Yes
2/3 honest majority
Yes

Size of mix set
Large
Large
Large
Small
Small
Large
Large

Ring signatures do not require a central authority as in group signatures [26] to specify the group members,
and do not demand any coordination between users during the generation of their public keys. Besides, users
do not need to communicate with each other while creating signatures. Furthermore, users may be unaware
that their public keys are included in a signature created by a signer they do not know.
In contrast to group signatures, ring signatures do not possess any authority having power to extract
the identity of the signer when necessary. This feature makes ring signatures a very attractive tool for the
applications demanding strong privacy for the users. However, it also makes it vulnerable to malicious users
to exploit this excessive anonymity, especially in some applications such as elections, i.e. the signer may create
two signatures, that can be counted as two votes without being noticed. As an extension of ring signatures,
Fujisaki et al. [32] introduced traceable ring signatures that enable users to trace such cases.
CryptoNote: Van Saberhagen [68] adopted a modified version of traceable ring signatures to get an
effective protocol, called CryptoNote, that achieves to conceal the addresses of both sender and receiver of a
transaction from other users. To hide the receiver’s address, CryptoNote creates a one-time verification-signing
key pair for each transaction directing the receiver If the receiver wants to claim one such transaction, he first
specifies n transaction outputs having the same amount, then combines all of them into a ring signature using
the corresponding one-time key. Mixing each transaction with the other specified transaction outputs enables
the receiver to hide the sender’s address. Besides, the proposed ring signature in the CryptoNote protocol does
not allow the receiver to use the same transaction output in two different transactions without being detected.
Although CryptoNote conceals the identities of both the sender and the receiver of a transaction, it also
presents some deficiencies that make the protocol vulnerable to analysis attacks. Kumar et al. [49] carried
out a forensic analysis on Monero, which is the most popular cryptocurrency built on top of the CryptoNote
protocol, to examine the untraceability characteristic of the protocol. They observed that 93% of all output
amounts appear only once in the network. Since the protocol requires users to combine a number of transaction
outputs having the same amount to form a transaction, they cannot be combined with any other transaction
output. Besides, the analysis in [49] showed that users prefer to use a small number of transaction outputs per
transaction, even if they could have used more to mix, to avoid a higher transaction fee. An adversary may
easily exploit this fact to break the untraceability of the protocol.
To remedy Monero’s deficiencies, Noether et al. [58] proposed an extension of CryptoNote protocol, called
ring confidential transaction (RingCT), that masks the amount in the transactions by signing a commitment of
the amount instead of the amount itself. Since the amounts in a transaction are hidden, the protocol just verifies
whether the total amount of input coins is equal to the total amount of output coins in the commitments for
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the validation of a given transaction. However, a malicious user may produce a transaction having a negative
amount which turns into a very large positive amount in the corresponding modulo. The protocol in [58] avoids
such cases by employing a range proof as part of the transaction that requires users to prove the output amount
of a given transaction lies in a predetermined range. Note that the protocol in [58] achieves the confidentiality
of transactions by producing a ring signature with a vector of signing keys rather than a single key. Thus, the
size of signature in the protocol becomes O(m(n + 1)) where m is the size of each vector and n is the number of
members in the corresponding ring. Sun et al. [65] introduced a new RingCT protocol that remarkably reduces
the size of signatures, i.e. the signature size in the protocol is O(m), independent of the ring size. Later, Yuen
et al. [70] proposed an eﬀicient RingCT that eliminates the trusted setup assumption required in the protocol
[65]. Table 2 compares the ring signature based methods discussed in this section.
Table 2. Comparison of ring signature based methods. For the asymptotic analysis, n and m indicate the ring size and
the number of transaction input, respectively.

Protocol
CryptoNote [68]
RingCT[58]
RingCT 2.0 [65]
RingCT 3.0 [70]

Requiring a
trusted setup
No
No
Yes
No

Hiding both sender’s
and receiver’s addresses
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Hiding the amount
of transaction
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Transaction size
O(n)
O(m(n + 1))
O(m)
O(m + log n)

3.3. Zero-knowledge proofs
A zero-knowledge proof [37] is a protocol that allows one party (prover) to convince another party (verifier)
that a statement is true without revealing any information other than this fact. A zero-knowledge proof should
satisfy the following properties: completeness (if both the prover and the verifier honestly follow the protocol, the
prover will eventually convince the verifier with high probability), soundness (a cheating prover cannot convince
an honest verifier about a false statement except for a small probability), and zero-knowledge (whatever the
verifier can learn with executing the protocol can be simulated without going through the protocol).
A regular zero-knowledge protocol requires interaction between the prover and the verifier. But it is
hard to realize in a blockchain since the proof must be publicly validated. Fortunately, there is a variant of
zero-knowledge proofs, called noninteractive zero-knowledge proof [15], that does not require the prover and
the verifier to interact with each other to execute the protocol. However, a noninteractive zero knowledge
proof entails some setup requirements such as a random oracle or a common reference string shared between
the prover and the verifier. On the other hand, zero-knowledge succinct noninteractive argument of knowledge
(zk-SNARK), first introduced by [14] as an eﬀicient family of NIZK proofs, enjoys succinct proofs that enable
verifiers to eﬀiciently validate the proofs.
Zerocoin: Miers et al. [54] introduced a distributed electronic cash system, called Zerocoin, that
extends the Bitcoin protocol to achieve fully anonymous transactions without incorporating trusted parties.
As shown in Figure 3, users first mint a zerocoin in renumeration for a predetermined amount of bitcoins by
computing a commitment C to a random serial number S they choose, and announce the commitment C to
the blockchain. To claim a zerocoin, users create a transaction having the serial number of that coin together
with a noninteractive zero knowledge proof showing that one of the unclaimed zerocoins (commitments) shared
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in the blockchain contains the corresponding serial number. The zero-knowledge property of the underlying
proof prevents one to link the claimed transaction to a specific address. Despite Zerocoin utilizing a one-way
accumulator based on the strong RSA assumption to minimize the proof size, it still struggles with the large
proof size, which makes it hard to realize Zerocoin in practice.

Figure 3. Zerocoin protocol.

To alleviate this issue, Garman et al. [35] proposed an extension of Zerocoin that reduces the proof size
by relaxing some assumptions. Besides, the extension [35] removes the random oracle assumption. The protocol
achieves the zero-knowledge property in the common reference string model where a trusted setup process should
be executed to generate public parameters for the underlying noninteractive zero-knowledge proof. Androulaki
et al. [3] demonstrated that some user spending patterns such as transaction amounts and address balances can
be exploited to recover user profiles. Within this direction, Androulaki et al. [4] introduced an effective protocol
for Zerocoin that hides the transaction amounts and the address balances. Unlike other Zerocoin variants, the
protocol also enables spending zerocoins directly without converting them back to bitcoins.
Zerocash: Remark that Zerocoin is not a full-fledged distributed cryptocurrency, rather it can be
viewed as a mechanism enabling users to clean their bitcoins through zerocoins they mint. On the other
hand, Zerocash [8] is a full-fledged decentralized payment scheme that provides strong anonymity guarantees
by employing zk-SNARKs. Unlike Zerocoin, Zerocash enables users to create anonymous transactions having
arbitrary denominations that hide both the receiver and sender of transactions as well as the amount. Instead
of RSA accumulators, Zerocash utilizes Merkle trees, which can be eﬀiciently embedded into zk-SNARK proofs,
for the set of unclaimed commitments to improve the performance, i.e. it achieves less than 1 kB transaction
size and less than 6 ms verification time at the 128-bit security level. Note that Zerocoin attains just more than
45 kB transaction size and less than 450 ms verification time at the same security level.
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Similar to the Zerocoin extension proposed by [35], Zerocash requires some public parameters, generated
in the setup phase, to securely operate zero-knowledge proofs. A malicious user holding the randomness used
in the generation process may violate the soundness and zero-knowledge properties of the underlying zeroknowledge proof, i.e. he may convince a verifier for a false statement and mint counterfeit coins in Zerocash.
Ben-Sasson et al. [9] showed that an MPC computation can be executed to generate the public parameters
for zk-SNARKs such that if at least one of the participants is honest, the resulting scheme will guarantee the
soundness property. Motivated by this result, Bowe et al. [18] introduced an MPC protocol to generate the
public parameters for the zk-SNARKs used in Zerocash. The protocol still provides full anonymity to users
even if all the participants who joined the public parameters’ generation were malicious. Note that there are
two types of transactions in Zcash: shielded transactions that hide the receiver, sender, and the amount of
the transaction, and transparent transactions that disclose the pseudonym addresses of the parties involved
together with the amount to the network, and using shielded transactions is optional in Zcash. Kappos et
al. [44] showed that, although shielded transactions provide full anonymity to users, most of them prefer to deal
with transparent transactions since the size of the proof and the verification time incur large overheads for the
prover and verifier. Moreover, Zhang et al. [71] remarked that users in Zcash preferring to deal with shielded
transactions are mostly miners and founders, which makes Zcash vulnerable to analysis attacks. In Table 3, we
compare the zero-knowledge based privacy-preserving techniques covered in this section.
Table 3. Comparison of zero-knowledge based methods. Since [4] did not provide any implementation supporting their
improvements, we left the transaction size and the verification time empty for the corresponding row. Also, [35] claimed
that their construction halves the verification time of Zerocoin. Similarly, since they did not prove any result to support
that, we left the corresponding place empty.

Protocol
Zerocoin [54]
[35]
EZC [4]
Zerocash [8]

Requiring a
trusted setup
No
No
No
Yes

Hiding both sender’s
and receiver’s addresses
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Hiding the amount
of transaction
No
No
Yes
Yes

Transaction
size
25 kB
10 kB
*
∼1 kB

Verification
time
450 ms
*
*
∼6 ms

4. Transaction privacy
As emphasized in Section 2, blockchain provides full transparency to users by making all the data shared in the
network available to every user. This level of transparency includes each user in verifying all the data shared in
the network and writing them to the ledger. However, revealing all the data to every participant of the network
yields serious privacy issues, especially in the applications processing sensitive data. Such privacy leakage impels
users to be unwilling to share sensitive data, or even to participate in the system. In this section, we review
a number of cryptographic primitives utilized to avoid such leakage and enhance the transaction privacy in
blockchain-based systems.
Secure multiparty computations: A secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol enables a set of
users to evaluate a function on the input provided by users in a distributed way while guaranteeing the privacy
of inputs and the correctness of the output. There are two different types of corruption model viewed in a
regular MPC protocol: passive corruption that considers whether an adversary can only get the internal state
of the corrupted users, and active corruption that considers whether an adversary can also drive the corrupted
parties not to follow the protocol.
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Zyskind et al. [73] proposed a decentralized computation platform, called Enigma, that enables users to
store data and to perform computations on data without leaking any useful information about data. While
data is stored as encrypted in a modified version of the Kademlia distributed hash table protocol that serves
as an off-chain network, an external blockchain is employed as a controller layer to manage access control and
to keep the tamper-proof log records. Enigma employs the secure MPC protocol given in [7] to process data
queries in a distributed way to ensure the privacy of data. The blockchain in the execution of secure multiparty
computation serves as the bulletin board required in the protocol [7] to guarantee the correctness.
Benhamouda et al. [10] integrated secure MPC protocol into Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned blockchain
architecture, to allow transactions to be processed while protecting their confidentiality. They remarked that
the trust model considered in a permissioned blockchain mimics the one considered in secure MPC protocols.
Thus, instead of outsourcing the secure multiparty computation to an off-chain entity, which increases the cost
of the implementation, their model implements the MPC protocol as a part of smart contracts in the blockchain
network. Data in their model is stored in the blockchain as encrypted, and when queried by a smart contract,
users first decrypt it, and give the decryption to the MPC protocol as their input.
Benhamouda et al. [40] incorporated MPC into Hyperledger Fabric to execute the clearing price mechanism of an initial public offering (IPO). In their model, each party employs an additive secret sharing scheme to
share his orders orderi (p) for all possible prices with the other parties where orderi (p) denotes the number of
shares he is willing to buy at the price p . The parties then execute the MPC protocol on the shares to calculate
the clearing price. At the end, the parties locally compute the share allocation (the number of shares each party
gets). The protocol guarantees the privacy of the orders in the passive model even with a single honest party.
Searchable encryptions: Searchable encryptions [63] allow a data owner to outsource his database as
encrypted to a server that performs some search queries over encrypted data requested by a data user on behalf
of the data owner. Most of the searchable encryption schemes require data users to acquire a search token given
by the corresponding data owner in order to request search queries. On the other hand, a regular searchable
encryption scheme should guarantee that the plain data are protected from both the server and the data user.
Besides, an ideal searchable encryption scheme should also hide data access patterns (which data records have
been used to generate the results for the search queries).
Hu et al. [42] introduced a decentralized privacy-preserving search scheme that employs symmetric
searchable encryption together with smart contracts to guarantee the correctness and confidentiality of data.
Data owners use a decentralized storage network such as interplanetary file system to store their data as
encrypted, and provide data (decrypted) to smart contracts when needed. To request a query, users first
communicate with data owners to acquire the search tokens. Smart contracts, which serve as the cloud server
in the scheme, then execute the search queries on data with the tokens and return the results to data users.
Chen et al. [28] proposed a blockchain-based searchable encryption scheme for electronic health records
that enables different health agents as data users to perform data queries on the encrypted medical data. Similar
to [42], the scheme utilizes a public cloud to store the medical records as encrypted and the blockchain to only
keep the search indexes for the data queries. Data users contact data owners to get the trapdoor for the queries
they request. They then provide the trapdoor to smart contracts that execute the search queries on the trapdoor
data users provide together with the corresponding search index, and return the results to data users.
On the other hand, Tang [66] remarked that directly changing the server with a smart contract may
create some undesired consequences, i.e. it may increase the cost of processing search queries, and data access
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patterns are revealed to all users having access to blockchain. To alleviate these drawbacks, they gave a generic
blockchain-based framework for searchable encryption that employs blockchain only to validate the search
results the servers provide, and to manage cash flow among users to guarantee fairness. Search queries in their
framework are performed by the server as in the regular searchable encryptions. The generic framework protects
the confidentiality of both data and search queries, and hides data access patterns.
Zero-knowledge proofs: Lu et al. [50] introduced the first blockchain-based crowdsourcing system
that incorporates a new cryptographic primitive, common-prefix linkable anonymous authentication, and zkSNARKs, that are compatible with the primitive to provide data confidentiality and anonymity. In the system,
a fresh address is created for each crowdsourcing task, and a smart contract is initiated to correctly execute
it. Similarly, each worker providing an answer to a task creates a fresh address, and submits his answer from
this address as encrypted together with a zk-SNARK proof to the corresponding contract. After obtaining
enough submissions, the requester first decrypts them to get the original answers, then calculates the reward
each worker deserves. She then prepares a zk-SNARK proof to show the validity of his decision, and announces
it to the blockchain. Finally, the corresponding smart contract sends the specified reward to each address. The
underlying zk-SNARKs and the use of a fresh address for each task guarantee that the answers cannot be linked
to a specific worker, and the submitted answers for a task are only revealed to the requester of the task.
Narula et al. [57] proposed a privacy-preserving distributed ledger, called zkLedger, that enables financial
institutions to exchange assets while providing strong transaction privacy and public verifiability. zkLedger can
be viewed as a table in which rows represent transactions and columns represent institutions. Each transaction
appears in the system as a commitment to a value that indicates the amount of assets received or sent by the
corresponding institution. The scheme also attaches a NIZK proof to transactions to validate the commitments.
With these techniques, zkLedger achieves to conceal the amounts and the identities contained in transactions
as well as transaction graphs. Unlike [50], it does not require a trusted setup.
In addition, Androulaki et al. [2] applies standard NIZK proofs to permissioned blockchains to build a
privacy-preserving token management system that runs in UTXO transaction model. The system allows users
to issue new tokens and to transfer their tokens to other users. Transactions in the system are represented by
commitments to the value and the owner of the corresponding token. When users want to send their tokens
to some other user, they create a transfer transaction containing a set of input tokens (as commitments) to be
spent and a set of output tokens (as commitments) to be issued. For each input and output token, users also
create a NIZK proof to show that the user in the relevant commitment is one of the registered users, and the
corresponding token is among the valid tokens contained in the blockchain.
5. Consensus privacy
A relatively new area in blockchain privacy research is the privacy of consensus protocols, where the purpose
is to hide the identity of the block producers in order to protect them from DoS or other types of attacks.
Consensus privacy is different from identity privacy in the sense that, identity privacy aims to hide the real-life
identities of participants whereas consensus privacy aims to hide who the next block producers are until they
reveal it themselves. This problem is particularly meaningful for committee-based PoS consensus protocols,
where time is divided into epochs, and a set of leaders are in charge of producing blocks in that epoch and also
of selecting the leaders for the next epoch. If the leaders’ identities are revealed, they may become targets of
attacks. A number of different protocols have emerged over the past couple of years with an increasing degree
of sophistication and privacy guarantees.
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One of the earliest studies on PoS privacy was conducted by Azouvi, McCorry, and Meiklejohn [5].
They proposed the secure leader election protocol Caucus as a part of the consensus protocol Fantomette.
They proved that Caucus satisfies three fundamental security properties of a leader election protocol: liveness,
unpredictability, and fairness. Furthermore, it guarantees that a leader’s identity is revealed only when it is
to be used, so that he will not be targeted by DoS or other kinds of attacks. In this respect, it is similar to
Algorand [27], where any chosen committee member is replaced as soon as he participates in a consensus.
The single secret leader election (SSLE) proposal of Boneh et al. [16] improves the leader election protocols
of Fantomette and Algorand: The election protocols of Fantomette and Algorand return a shortlist of potential
leaders, which is resolved by a run-off procedure, whereas the SSLE protocol of Boneh et al. [16] returns a single
leader securely. Boneh et al. [16] first stated the security definitions an SSLE scheme must satisfy. Then they
gave such a protocol based on indistinguishable obfuscation. They also gave alternative constructions based on
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and the decisional Diﬀie-Hellman (DDH) problem.
The protocols we summarized so far are mainly concerned with a secret way of electing a leader or
members of a committee. If we recall the two privacy criteria for PoS protocols we mentioned at the beginning
of this section, the protocols discussed so far deal with the first criterion only. More recently some more
sophisticated protocols have emerged which addressed the second privacy criterion as well, namely keeping the
stake information of participants secret.
The first protocol to hide participants’ stakes in a PoS system was the Ouroboros Crypsinous protocol [45].
The Ouroboros Crypsinous protocol is constructed from the Ouroboros Genesis protocol in a way to keep the
user stakes secret. In Ouroboros Genesis, the information of user stakes is used for verification of slot leaders.
Ouroboros Crypsinous replaces this with a Zerocash-like system [8] where each coin can be spent only once,
and each coin is separately eligible to be a leader according to a randomly generated value.
A more sophisticated solution to the problem of keeping leader stakes secret is to design an anonymous
lottery function. Each user can privately evaluate a selection function to see whether he is the leader for a given
tag. If he is, he obtains an anonymous proof for this with no identities attached to it. Ganesh et al. [33] gave
the first formal definition of this problem and proved its feasibility. Furthermore, they gave constructions based
on some well-known PoS consensus protocols such as Ouroboros Praos [30] and Algorand [27].
A second solution along the same lines as Ganesh et al. [33] was presented by Baldimtsi et al. [6]. Their
system resembles to that of Ganesh et al. [33] in terms of basic functionality, but it is more advanced in certain
aspects: First, its proof is more flexible for composability with other protocols and, second, its operation does
not require an anonymous broadcast channel, making it more feasible to realize in practice. In a related work,
Kohlweiss et al. [47] demonstrated that even an ideal broadcast channel may not be suﬀicient for this purpose
and an attacker can use network delays to distinguish stakeholders.

6. Smart contract privacy
A smart contract is a piece of code that enables trusted execution of a contract without relying on a trusted
third party. Although smart contracts promise remarkable advantages such as self-execution and removing
trusted third parties, they bear the privacy concerns a blockchain presents: All the transactions related to a
smart contract are visible to all the nodes in the blockchain. This public nature of smart contracts introduces
privacy issues and hinders their adoption for a wider range of applications.
To resolve this issue, Hawk [48] was introduced as a framework that enables privacy-preserving smart
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contracts. Similar to Zerocash [8], a user aiming to perform a confidential transaction first creates a private
coin as a commitment to one of his public coins. When requesting execution of a smart contract, the user
binds this private coin to the contract by submitting a commitment to the coin’s value and the user’s input
along with a zero-knowledge proof for the correctness of the commitment. The user provides the commitment
to the manager encrypted under the manager’s public key. The manager then applies off-chain computation
to calculate the payout distribution, and creates new private coins to be given to each user. He then submits
newly created coins together with zero-knowledge proofs of the correctness to the smart contract. The smart
contract finally reallocates the previously bound coins among the corresponding users.
Two instantiations were proposed to realize trusted managers in Hawk: implementing a secure multiparty
computation among a number of users, or utilizing a trusted execution environment (TEE) such as the Intel
SGX. However, none of them will remove the dependency of the system to the cryptographic heavy tools. To
eliminate such dependency, Ekiden [29] considers an architecture in which computations over private data are
executed off-chain in TEEs and attestations of correct execution are validated in the blockchain. However,
eliminating such dependency comes with a price: Ekiden employs a key manager to periodically issue keys
used to encrypt messages shared between the underlying TEE and users. Ekiden also uses a digital signature
compatible with the underlying encryption scheme for attestation. Although Ekiden can be applied to a broad
range of use cases, it is still vulnerable to some practical attacks [19].
Steffen et al. [64] proposed zkay, a language that identifies the owners of private data through some
privacy types. To realize zkay contracts, they are converted into equivalent public contracts in a privacy
preserving way that can be executed on public blockchains. The proposed scheme utilizes NIZK proofs together
with an encryption scheme to ensure that public contracts protect the privacy of private data and preserve
the functionality of the original contracts. However, the zkay language is only applicable to a limited number
of private data. On the other hand, Zether [20] was introduced as a decentralized payment mechanism in
an account-based model that uses privacy-preserving smart contracts, compatible with Ethereum and similar
smart contract platforms, to conceal the account balances and to employ confidential transactions to update
the associated balances. Zether employs ElGamal encryption to hide both the balances and transaction values,
and a modification of Bulletproofs [21] to prove the correctness of encryptions. Note that ElGamal encryption
used is additively homomorphic, which enables users to privately update their balances. Table 4 compares the
privacy-enhancing techniques discussed in this section.
Table 4. Comparison of privacy-enhancing techniques analyzed in Section 6.

Protocol
Hawk [48]
Ekiden [29]
Zkay [64]
Zether [20]

Building
Block
zk-SNARKs
TEE
zk-SNARKs
NIZK

Relying on a
trusted setup
Yes
No
Yes
No

Range of
contract types
Limited
Broad
Limited
Limited

Calculations
take place
Off-chain
Off-chain
On-chain
On-chain

Requiring a
trusted manager
Yes
Yes
No
No

7. Future research directions
Privacy is a demanding feature for a blockchain, where activities are supposed to be in public view. Many novel
solutions have been developed for this purpose. However, strong privacy on a blockchain can also be a point of
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exploitation for illegal activities [55]. This fact introduces serious concerns for regulatory authorities which would
rather not approve systems that allow illegal activities with no accountability. Since privacy and accountability
are conflicting notions, integrating accountability into privacy-preserving settings will be a challenging task.
There are studies in the literature [34, 38] that add accountability features into privacy-preserving blockchains.
However there are still no effective solutions that satisfy all demands of both authorities and users.
Many privacy-preserving techniques for blockchains utilize the cryptographic primitive zk-SNARKs.
While zk-SNARKs provide succinct proofs that enjoy strong privacy, they rely on a trusted setup to securely
operate zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover this assumption imposes a significant burden for some solutions, e.g.,
Hawk [48] executes a fresh trusted setup for each smart contract issued. In addition to the burden it incurs, it
also puts the system at risk where the setup process might be subverted by a malicious user aiming to damage
the system. Thus, it will be an interesting direction to design a privacy-preserving system that enjoys the same
level of privacy without relying on trusted assumptions.
The methods covered in this paper mostly utilize heavy cryptographic primitives such as ring signatures
and zero-knowledge proofs to enhance privacy. Even though there are studies attempting to improve eﬀiciency
[21, 59], they still suffer from large transaction sizes and long verification time. Such deficiencies obstruct a largescale deployment of these methods, especially for applications running in resource-constrained environments.
Thus, an important direction for future research is the development of more eﬀicient privacy-enhancing methods.
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